

OVERVIEW OF IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO GRENFELL TOWER FIRE LEARNING

1. The Service continues to make significant and sustained progress in implementing and evidencing the recommendations within the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report. We have acted locally in our area of statutory responsibility, taking actions within our direct control to improve fire safety of identified at-risk buildings, and work alongside local authority partners within the existing mechanisms to provide fire safety input at the earliest stages of planning. We continue to seek opportunities to make regional and national contributions to fire safety and protection policy so that our communities and local authority partners can benefit from relevant and current policy and guidance.
2. We have undertaken improvement activity in our operational preparedness and our operational response; how well we understand our risk environment with appropriate plans and how our people and resources are trained and equipped to deal with a significant fire in a high-rise building. The organisation has introduced a revised inspection regime, new operational response packages, updated training and implemented this training across all operational staff and conducted assurance exercises to identify how revised procedures have been embedded across the Service. Furthermore, the outcomes of Fire Safety Audits influence our operational preparedness and response, and the sharing of information our between Protection delivery and Response teams continues to improve our understanding of risk.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

3. The Service has created a dedicated team: the High-Risk Residential Buildings Inspection Programme Team (HRRBIP) who, as at the 9th November, have delivered the following:
 - (a) Identified buildings in scope by the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC). 283 buildings identified in Hampshire and Isle of Wight fell into this category.
 - (b) Through locally driven risk analysis the HRRBIP team identified a further 88 buildings that were not contained within the NFCC data, giving a total of 371 buildings in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight.

(c) 346 buildings have been inspected by the HRRBIT to date (93%). These have been triaged and reports returned to the NFCC project team. The remaining 7% (25 buildings) will be inspected by 31 December 2021.

(d) Outcomes of inspections to date are as follows:

- a. 35%: A satisfactory inspection where no further remedial action is required.
 - b. 3%: An unsatisfactory inspection with formal remedial action including Enforcement Notices is issued.
 - c. 62%: Informal advice that Responsible Persons are provided with to improve safety for occupants – though minimum statutory requirements have already been met.
4. The HRRBIP prioritised the inspection of Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) clad high-rise residential buildings before moving onto a second phase of inspections of all high-rise residential buildings (18 metres and above in height) in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. The second phase was completed by end of August 2021, with the inspection of a further 88 buildings identified through locally driven risk analysis being completed by 31 December 2021 (with, as of 9 November) only 25 of these 88 are left to inspect.
 5. The Service introduced revised operational response plans for high-rise buildings, making a clear distinction between the resources required for cladded and non-cladded buildings, so that operational teams have the right resources promptly deployed to support the early resolution of incidents. This is driven by the audit outcome and provision of EWS information from Engineers Reports and Fire Risk Assessments.
 6. We have reviewed our approach to fire survival guidance that is given from Fire Control, including exercising our Fire Control in this approach. This has been mirrored across our Network Fire Services Partnership (NFSP) who continue to evolve mechanisms for supporting fire survival guidance to respond to high numbers of calls in the event of a significant fire in a high-rise building.
 7. We have implemented a new Immediate Building Evacuation (IBE) message which enables Incident Commanders to command and control an immediate evacuation of a building with appropriate resources. The IBE approach triggers a package of resources and incident type that ensure that FRS and multi-agency partners can respond swiftly.
 8. We have employed a dedicated training Watch Manager for 6 months to oversee the roll out the training for the revised Fires in Tall Buildings (FiTBs) operational guidance.

9. We have purchased, allocated to appliances, and trained our teams in the use of smoke hoods to support of large-scale evacuations, where no alternate method of evacuation is available to crews.
10. In partnership with the NFSP, we have developed a revised set of high-rise tactical guidance and operational prompts which are compliant with sector best practice NOG. This has been developed in-line with the learning from the national High-Rise incidents and Built Environment Working Group.
11. We have introduced evacuation sectors into the command structure with Evacuation Sector Commanders resourced both on the fireground and in Fire Control.
12. All operational staff, Flexible Duty System officers and Fire Control staff have undertaken training and assurance activities on the revised FiTBs which supports them to identify the dangers of external fire spread, building failure, evacuation strategies and when to cease 'stay put' policies.
13. We have introduced and exercised a direct and dedicated communications link between control room and incident commander.
14. The new Fire in Tall Buildings procedure with underpinning tactical guidance and operational prompts went live within HIWFRS on 1st October 2021. HIWFRS are the first fire service within the Network Fire Services Partnership to move to this new position with a set of tactical procedures that are current.
15. Our service exercise held on 2nd October 2021 was designed to test and learn from all aspects of the revised FiTBs tactical guidance and operational prompts and provide assurance on the extent to which this was embedded across the Service. Using locations in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight we were able to test all levels of our operational response, from firefighter to strategic commander. The learning outcomes from this exercise will be used to maximise our operational assurance opportunity.
16. Our procedures for the identification and gathering of relevant risk data, has been updated and refined (Premise Risk Information Procedure) which has included developing training for crews' risk information gathering, and ensuring we are equipped to receive and store electronic plans.
17. Updated the maintenance of competence scheme for all Control staff.
18. The management of resources, communication on the incident ground and application of Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) principles within our maintenance of competence scheme for all operational staff, irrespective of role.

19. JESIP inter Control room talk group established.

SUMMARY AGAINST GRENFELL TOWER FIRE INQUIRY PH 1 FINDINGS

20. Our current performance towards the 29 FRS sector specific Grenfell Towers recommendation (as inspected by HMICFRS for LFB):

Complete	Complete Spring 2022	Complete after Spring 2022
26	2	1

In that last 6 months, since the last report to FRA, HIWFRS has completed an additional 13 recommendations.

21. Four of the completed recommendations call for amendment to JESIP Joint Doctrine Edition 2. HIWFRS had already completed these recommendations in line with the recommendations. JESIP is currently releasing an Edition 3 (consultation closed April 2021) which HIWFRS will review.

ACTIONS DUE SPRING 2022

22. Hampshire and Isle of Wight Local Resilience Forum (HIWLRF) planning assistance on identifying vulnerable people recommendation.

These mechanisms were tested as part of the service exercise and the multi-agency debrief is being used to capture learning to inform the next steps towards completion, by the LRF within Spring 2022.

23. NFSP are reviewing an App produced by LFB for the recording and simultaneous displaying of Fire Survival Guidance, on the incident ground. This has been delayed from Autumn 2021 to Spring 2022.

ACTION DUE AFTER SPRING 2022

24. This relates to the procurement and application of Multi-Agency Incident Transfer (MAIT) which is dictated by Capita software upgrade timelines, as the NFSP command and control Suppliers.

ASSURANCE

25. Internal Governance provides assurance on progress against all the activities detailed in the paragraphs above. Depending on the specific topic of the activity it will be scrutinised under the accountability of the Director of Operations or the Director for Policy, Planning and Assurance.